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Optimal government finance models illustrating trade-offs between different policy 
instruments, such as seigniorage and income taxes, have focused on industrialized countries. 
In this paper, a model that includes the effective reserve ratio and currency growth rate as 
instruments is derived from a welfare loss function and is estimated using fixed effects for a 
sample of 29 developing countries. The results indicate that the governments in the sample 
use the reserve requirement to minimize the welfare losses associated with seigniorage 
revenue. Mid-level democracies are associated with the highest effective reserve ratios. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Seigniorage, defined as government revenue from increases in the monetary base, is a 
greater source of revenue in developing countries than in industrialized countries. This 
paper examines the trade-off between the two components of the monetary base, reserves 
and currency, using an optimal government finance model for a sample of 29 developing 
countries. Developing countries generally are believed to use seigniorage extensively 
because they have ineffective tax systems and do not conduct open market operations to a 
significant extent (Chamley (1991)). In addition, the percentage of seigniorage extracted 
from the reserve component of the monetary base is greater in developing countries than 
in industrialized countries. For example, Latin American countries procure four to five 
times as much seigniorage as a percentage of GNP as industrial economies, and more 
than half of it comes from the reserve component (McKinnon (1991)). Such financial 
repression may be optimal for government revenue maximization in countries where tax 
evasion is prevalent (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). 
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While high reserve requirements constitute financial repression, some economists 
favor a relatively low rate. A fundamental argument for a minimal reserve requirement 
is based on the asymmetric information between depositors and bank investors. 
Depositors cannot observe the investments made by banks. As a result, banks are 
inclined to hold too few reserves and make riskier investments than are optimal. Bank 
reserves also allow depositors a greater measure of liquidity. Consequently, a minimal 
reserve requirement theoretically leads to a Pareto superior portfolio than would occur 
without restrictions (Cothren (1987)). However, reserve requirements typically average 
7 percent in industrialized countries but average over 20 percent in developing countries 
(Fry (1995)). While part of this disparity may be due to greater asymmetric information 
in developing countries, it is unlikely that such high reserve requirement ratios are 
optimal for financial market efficiency. McKinnon and Mathieson (1981, p.5) 
characterize the high reserve requirements in some countries as “forced sales of 
government debt to the banking system.” The premise of this paper is that the reserve 
requirement is used strategically in developing countries to augment seigniorage revenue 
while minimizing the welfare losses of seigniorage creation. The reserve requirement 
may be used to increase the base on which the inflation tax is levied while keeping 
inflation at a rate lower than it otherwise would be. 
Evidence of such optimizing behavior has been found by Brock (1989). An increase 
in the reserve requirement ratio is likely to be deflationary - money supply decreases 
through a decrease in the money multiplier and real demand for money is likely to 
increase.
1 Thus, in the absence of government intervention, negative correlations 
between the reserve requirement and currency growth can be expected. If the 
government is using the reserve requirement strategically, the reserve requirement may 
be increased in tandem with the currency growth rate to ameliorate the overall welfare 
loss. In this case, a positive association can be expected between the reserve requirement 
and currency growth rate. Brock finds positive correlations between reserve ratios and 
inflation rates in Latin American and African countries and negative or insignificant 
correlations in most Asian countries. He interprets the positive correlations as the result 
of government policy actively raising reserve requirements when inflation rates rise in 
order to minimize the welfare cost of inflation.   
Reserve requirements and inflation interact to affect the economy in general and the 
 
1 An increase in the reserve requirement has three main effects on the demand for money. First, there is a 
direct increase in the demand for reserves which increases the demand for money. Second, to the extent that 
the rate on deposits decreases, households may switch out of deposits to currency, which also increases the 
demand for money because the decrease in the demand for deposits reduces money demand only fractionally 
while the increase in the demand for currency is one-for-one. Third, following a decrease in the deposit rate, 
households may switch from deposits to non-cash assets, such as earning assets, which decreases the demand 
for money. Because the first two effects are likely to outweigh the third effect, an increase in the reserve 
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financial sector in particular. Any printing of currency by the government in excess of 
money demand results in inflation. High and variable inflation rates reduce financial 
intermediation and slow economic growth by increasing uncertainty and shifting 
investments to nonproductive physical assets.   
Excessive reserve requirements have a similar effect on financial intermediation and 
economic growth. An increase in the reserve requirement transfers funds from the 
private to the public sector and induces an increase in the interest rate spread as bank 
officials try to make up for the lost profit of idle reserves (Killick and Martin (1993)). 
Financial intermediation decreases and resources are not directed to their most 
productive uses. The reduction in the return to saving slows the accumulation of 
income-producing assets and reduces the tax base over time (Drazen (1989)). In addition, 
if loan rates increase significantly, adverse selection (in which safer borrowers are 
discouraged from applying for loans) and the incentive effect (which encourages riskier 
investments) may also reduce bank profits (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Thus, both the 
inflationary and noninflationary components of seigniorage may impose significant 




2.  OPTIMAL  GOVERNMENT  FINANCE 
 
The optimal government finance framework entails the minimization of a social loss 
function which is comprised of an assumed parameterization of two instruments, such as 
seigniorage and income taxes. Because the marginal costs of each tax are equated at the 
optimum, the levels of the two instruments can be expected to move together. The 
literature in this area has focused on the United States and other industrialized countries. 
Mankiw (1987), using 33 years of U.S. data, finds that the level of direct taxation moves 
in the same direction as inflation, consistent with a social loss minimization objective. 
Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) also examine an expected loss function with an income 
tax and the inflation rate as variables. They find positive correlations between taxes and 
inflation in the U.S. and Japan but negative or statistically insignificant correlations for 
Britain, France, and Germany. Berument (1994) builds on the work of Poterba and 
Rotemberg by differentiating between political parties. Using seigniorage and tax 
revenue as instruments for a sample of 15 industrialized countries, he finds some support 
for the optimal government finance hypothesis and also that left-wing administrations 
use more seigniorage revenue than right-wing administrations to finance spending.   
Other authors have focused on the effect of political variables, such as polarization, 
political instability, and influence of pressure groups, on macroeconomic outcomes. 
Alesina and Sachs (1988) present a model to explain business cycles in the U.S. in 
which the Republican party is relatively averse to money growth while the Democratic 
party is more concerned with an employment target. Eaton (1994) shows that 
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will impose higher reserve requirements both to reduce the need for inflationary 
seigniorage and to raise the interest rate on loans. In Cukierman et al. (1992), 
governments may rely on seigniorage as a major source of revenue if they perceive a 
low probability of re-election and are therefore less inclined to reform the tax system. 
They conclude that tax system efficiency is a function of political instability and 
polarization. 
Some authors have rejected the optimal government finance approach outright based 
on the results of this political economy approach. Edwards and Tabellini (1991), using 
data for 21 developing countries over 34 years, find little support for the optimal 
government finance framework, and instead posit that inflation will be higher the more 
polarized the society and the greater the political instability. In such societies, the 
government has weak reputational incentive. Polarization and political instability, both 
variously measured, are not significant in explaining trade taxes as a percentage of 
government revenue, but political instability is positively related to budget deficits. 
Roubini (1991) also rejects the optimal government finance framework. Tax 
revenues are significantly positively associated with seigniorage revenue in only 37 of 
the 90 countries in his sample. Using the frequency of government change as a proxy for 
political instability, he tests the hypothesis that political instability causes high budget 
deficits. He finds that seigniorage and political instability are significant explanatory 
variables for fiscal deficits.   
The latter two articles examine developing countries and refute optimal government 
finance theory, while the studies that find support for the theory focus on industrialized 
countries. Much of the existing optimal government finance literature examines the 
relationship between money growth and a direct tax and does not differentiate between 
the two components of seigniorage - the non-inflationary reserve component and 
inflationary currency growth. It is this trade-off however, that governments in 
developing countries, where tax collection is ineffective, may be considering.   
In this paper, an optimal government finance model is examined using the effective 
reserve ratio and currency growth as instruments for a sample of 29 developing 
countries.
2 The model is further specified by the addition of a democracy variable and 
openness to trade. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is 
described in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the empirical specification. Section 5 
discusses the data. Section 6 presents the results, including those with other government 
revenue added to the model and those using lagged values of some potentially 




2 The effective reserve ratio is defined as reserves as a proportion of total money demand. OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND DEMOCRACY    135
3.  THE  MODEL 
 
The model is based mainly on the work of Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) and 
Berument (1994). An equation is derived from a welfare loss function that is convex in 
two variables - the effective reserve ratio and the negative inverse of the currency 
growth rate. 
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between zero and one. The objective function may be interpreted as the cost of raising 
seigniorage revenue or as the welfare loss of seigniorage creation. The elasticities are 
assumed to be constant so the objective function is a generalization of the constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) welfare function as in Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) and 
Berument (1994). The deadweight loss associated with the currency growth rate is stated 
as the negative inverse of the growth rate to allow derivation of a testable equation. 
Government revenue from seigniorage is equal to the real change in the monetary 
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where    is the monetary base,    is the price level, and    is the nominal level of 
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where  t b  is government debt and    is government spending at time t.  t GRENÉE D. NIEBERDING    136
The Lagrangian in time    is  t
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ε  and is the elasticity of real currency holdings with respect 






   









































ε    and is the elasticity of real deposit holdings with respect to 
the reserve requirement ratio. 
The government equates the marginal cost of the reserve requirement ratio to the 
marginal cost of currency growth at the optimum. Equating marginal costs and taking 
natural logarithms yields 
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φ = = . 
If the governments in the sample are using the reserve requirement strategically to 
minimize the welfare losses of seigniorage creation,    will be positive and significant. 
Under this scenario, the government may use the reserve ratio to increase the base on 
which the inflation tax is levied while tempering increases in inflation, such that 
inflation may increase less than what it would without the mitigating effect of the 
reserve ratio. Absent government intervention, the reserve ratio and the currency growth 
rate are expected to move in opposite directions - an increase (decrease) in the effective 




4.  EMPIRICAL  SPECIFICATION 
 
Equation (8) reflects the preferences of the government as stated in the welfare loss 
function. Democracy and openness to trade are added to the final estimation. While 
these variables are ad hoc, there is justification for them in the existing literature, and 
their inclusion leads to a better specification of the model.   
Political variables are often significant determinants of macroeconomic policy in the 
literature.
3  One approach has been to use some measure of political instability to explain 
macroeconomic outcomes as in Edwards and Tabellini (1991) and Roubini (1991). 
Political instability as it is usually defined, however, is not independent of regime-type. 
For example, Roubini uses the frequency of government change as a proxy for political 
instability. Democracy is naturally more “unstable” than authoritarianism. According to 
Przeworski et al. (2000, p.212): “The phenomena that constitute anomalies, breakdowns 
of rule, under dictatorship are just essential, definitional features of democracy.” 
 
3 See Alesina and Sachs (1988), Cukierman et al. (1992), Edwards and Tabellini (1991), and Roubini 
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Changes of chief executive are regular and expected under democracy, while in 
authoritarian regimes changes often occur only by coup. Przeworski et al. (2000) find 
that political instability is much more frequent under democracies but affects economic 
performance only under dictatorships. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, political 
instability is not a very informative construct. 
Another approach has been to incorporate political preferences in empirical models 
according to partisan theory; the interests of different constituencies are represented by 
different political parties. For example, in Alesina and Sachs (1988) the Republican 
party is more averse to money growth while the Democratic party is more concerned 
with employment. Similarly, in Berument (1994) party   is relatively more averse to 
money growth than party 
R
D . As a result, the Democratic party is more likely to create 
inflationary surprises to exploit the Phillips curve and thereby increase employment. 
This dichotomy is often applicable in developed countries, but it becomes more 
intractable in the developing world. One reason is that labor rarely has had significant 
influence in developing countries (Geddes (1995)). Moreover, in most countries, 
business groups are quite varied in their interests and often opposed regarding economic 
policy (Sullivan (1995)). Rather than clearly defined partisanship, what appears to occur 
in developing countries, is a marked increase in demands from a myriad of interest 
groups as the country enters a democratic transition. The government must then contend 
with the old elite of the authoritarian regime as well as newly vocal interest groups. The 
compulsion to augment government revenue with seigniorage may be at its greatest 
during this period.   
Evidence in accord with this view is found by Haggard and Kaufman (1989). Using 
data from 25 Latin America, Asian, and African countries, they find that: (1) while 
democratic governments did not control expenditures as well as authoritarian 
governments, they did as well controlling deficits and credit expansion, and (2) countries 
undergoing democratic transitions appeared to pursue more expansionist policies than 
either established democracies or authoritarian governments. Both changes in 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP and expansion of central bank credit were 
significantly higher in countries undergoing democratic transitions than in either 
continuous democratic or authoritarian regimes. This suggests a nonlinear relationship 
between the level of democracy and financially oppressive measures such as the reserve 
ratio; governments in the mid-range of the democracy scale may use the reserve 
requirement to a greater extent than those at the ends.   
A defining characteristic of democracy is significant competition among political 
candidates (Przeworski et al. (2000)). A democracy variable based on this definition and 
described in greater detail in Section 5, is included in the regression equation along with 
its square. The sign for the level of democracy is expected to be positive while the sign 
for the squared term is expected to be negative. 
Lastly, openness to trade may also affect the dependent variable. Romer (1993) has 
found a significant negative relationship between openness to trade and inflation. A 
surprise monetary expansion causes the real exchange rate to depreciate. The more open OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND DEMOCRACY    139
the economy, the greater the harm caused by the depreciation. In countries less open to 
trade, the incentive to inflate is greater, and the equilibrium inflation rate is higher. 
Countries less open to trade may be more inclined to use the effective reserve ratio to 
moderate the higher equilibrium inflation rate. In addition, countries that are not open to 
trade have limited ability to earn foreign exchange and are more likely to experience 
debt crises. Governments in these countries may be predisposed to using seigniorage 
revenue. The logarithm of the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP is included in the set 
of explanatory variables and the sign is expected to be negative. 
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logarithm of the deposit-currency ratio in time t  and represents the decisions of 
households to put money in deposits versus currency. The parameter for this variable is 







 is the natural logarithm of the currency growth rate 
between times   and  . If the optimal government finance model applies to the 
sample countries, currency growth rates and reserve requirement rates will move in the 
same direction. Thus, the parameter estimate for this variable is expected to be positive. 
A negative or insignificant parameter estimate will counter optimal government finance 
theory for the developing countries in this sample.   is the level of democracy in 
time  . Democracy is an eight-point scale ranging from one to eight, with one being the 
lowest level of democracy and eight being the highest. The parameter estimate for the 
level of democracy is expected to be positive, while that for the squared term is expected 










  is the natural logarithm of the ratio of exports plus imports to gross 
domestic product in time  . This variable is expected to have a negative parameter 
estimate. Finally,    is the random error term and is independently identically 
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5.  DATA 
 
The data are annual and range from 1967 to 1994. The 29 countries in the sample 
have been chosen mainly based on data availability.
4  Data for the effective reserve ratio, 
deposit levels, currency levels, exports, imports, and GDP are from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) by the International Monetary Fund.
5 The  democracy  variable 
is from the Polity III dataset constructed by Jaggers and Gurr (1996). The variable is 
constructed from two of the three components of the ten-point institutional democracy 
variable - competitiveness of executive recruitment and competitiveness of political 
participation - resulting in an eight-point scale.
6 The third element comprising the 
institutional democracy variable, constraints on the chief executive, is omitted. In the 
Polity III dataset, institutional democracy increases with increases in executive 
constraints. However, increases in executive constraints may hinder the government’s 
ability to manipulate the dependent variable, and therefore this aspect of institutional 
democracy may have a confounding influence in the regression. The measure used in 
this paper is designed to capture only the competitiveness of the political process.   
Thirteen countries are missing anywhere from one to five years of data for the 
democracy variable. For each case, these missing values are replaced based on the chief 
executive in power during the respective year and information such as his or her party 
 
4 The countries included in the sample are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, India, Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, 
Nigeria, and Sudan for a total of 29 countries - fifteen Latin American and Caribbean, seven Asian, and seven 
African. 
5 IFS item numbers 14, 14a, 24, 34, 35, 90c, 98c and 99b, referring to total reserve money, currency held 
outside banks, demand deposits, money, quasi-money, exports, imports, and GDP respectively, are used in 
the calculations. The effective reserve ratio is equal to  ). 14 35 34 /( ) 14 14 ( a a − + −  The deposit-currency 
ratio is   the currency growth rate is   and the proportion that exports plus imports 
comprise of GDP is    Data for exports, imports, and GDP are missing from the March 1996 
CD-ROM for the years 1992-94 for Sudan. These data were obtained from the CIA World Factbook. 
, 14 / 24 a , 1 − 14 / 14 t t a a
. 99 / ) 98 90 ( b c c +
6  Competitiveness of executive recruitment is a three-point scale coded as follows: (1) if the chief 
executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or some combination of the two, (2) if there 
are dual executives with one chosen by hereditary succession and the other by competitive elections or if 
there is some transitional arrangement, or (3) if chief executives are chosen through competitive elections. 
Competitiveness of political participation is a five-point scale coded as follows: (1) if no significant 
oppositional activity is allowed outside of the ruling party, (2) if some limited, organized political 
competition occurs outside the ruling party, (3) if there are factional patterns of competition, (4) if there is a 
transition from restricted or factional competition to fully competitive elections or vice versa, or (5) if 
elections are fully competitive with competition rarely causing widespread violence or disruption. (Gurr et al. 
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affiliation or the value for other years in power. A more detailed explanation is available 
from the author upon request. 
 
 
6.  RESULTS 
 
Before pooling the data, each individual time series is tested for stationarity using 
three formal tests, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), the Leybourne-McCabe (LM), 
and the Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock (ERS) tests. The Box-Jenkins approach, in which an 
appropriate ARIMA model is fit to the data followed by residual diagnostics to ensure 
that the residuals are white noise, is also employed. Including a constant and trend, the 
ADF test indicates nonstationarity in 95 percent of the time series, the LM test in 85 
percent, and the ERS test in 74 percent. However, the Box-Jenkins approach indicates 
nonstationarity in only four percent of the time series. The ADF test has been shown to 
have low power in small samples (see Agiakloglou and Newbold (1992)). While the LM 
and ERS tests purportedly have better power than the ADF test, due to the small sample 
size per country (28 observations), the Box-Jenkins approach is given the most weight. 
Thus, the data are treated as stationary and corrected for first-order autocorrelation. Stata, 
version 7.0, is used to estimate the model. The “xtpcse” command which calculates 
panel-corrected standard error estimates is used. The parameters are estimated by the 
Prais-Winsten method. 
Results of the least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimation are presented in 
Table 1. All coefficient estimates have the expected sign, and all but that for the trend 
variable are significant at the one or five percent level. The parameter estimate for the 
currency growth rate is positive and significant, indicating that the sample-country 
governments are indeed using the reserve ratio in a strategic way to minimize the 
welfare losses associated with the creation of seigniorage revenue. The coefficient 
estimate indicates that a 10 percent increase in the currency growth rate leads to a 1.62 
percent increase in the effective reserve ratio. In addition, the democracy variable in 
levels is positive and significant while the squared term is negative and significant, 
indicating an inverted U-shape with mid-level democracies having the highest effective 
reserve ratios. Openness to trade is also negative and significant providing support for 
the hypothesis that the governments likely to have higher equilibrium inflation rates also 
have higher effective reserve ratios. Using  = 0.213 and  = 0.162 to calculate  1 φ 2 φ α  
and  β  from the welfare loss function yields α = 1/0.213 = 4.695 and  β = (4.695) 
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Table 1.    Results of the LSDV Model 
Independent Variable 
(Natural Logarithm) 
Coefficient Estimate  t statistic
 
Year -0.003  -1.13 
Deposit/Currency Ratio  0.212  2.94
** 
Currency Growth Rate  0.162 4.13
** 
Democracy 0.121  2.86
** 
Democracy Squared  -0.014  -2.51
* 
(Exports + Imports)/GDP  -0.150  -2.51
* 
R
2  0.497 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the effective reserve ratio, defined as reserves as a 
proportion of total money demand. One asterisk next to the t statistic indicates the coefficient estimate is 
significant at the 5% level; two indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
The   of 0.497 must be interpreted with caution due to the 28 dummy 
variables in the model. A better measure of the model’s explanatory power may be 
ascertained by estimating the model with one constant term, omitting the individual 





The Effect of Other Revenue on the Effective Reserve Ratio 
 
The model assumes that tax collection is at a low and inefficient level. However, tax 
revenue is a component of most optimal government finance models. Accordingly, tax 
revenue may be an important variable in this model, and its omission would bias the 
parameter estimates. The social losses associated with taxes can be incorporated into the 
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where    is the income tax rate,    is a positive constant,    is income, and all other  t θ t γ t Y
 
7 In the regression with one constant term, the currency growth rate is significant at the one percent level 
of confidence and the openness to trade variable is significant at about the five percent level. All other 
variables are insignificant. These results are not formally presented because the parameter estimates are 
biased if the individual effects are not taken into account. OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND DEMOCRACY    143
variables are as previously defined. The marginal costs of currency growth and the 
reserve requirement ratio are the same as in Equations (5) and (6), respectively. The 






   








































ε    and is the elasticity of real income with respect to the tax rate. 
To solve for the reserve ratio in terms of both the currency growth rate and the tax 
rate, I take natural logs as before, solve for the reserve ratio in terms of each of the other 
two variables individually, and then sum the two equations to solve for the reserve ratio 
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φ = = = =  
The full model with the democracy and openness to trade variables is estimated 
using the deposit-GDP ratio and central government revenue as a proportion of GDP for 
 a n d   , respectively. t t Y D / t θ
8 Central government revenue data are insufficient for 
Madagascar, Malawi, and Sudan, and these countries are dropped from the estimation. 
The ratio of demand deposits to GDP, which is equivalent to the ratio of M1 minus 
currency to GDP, may be viewed as a measure of financial deepening. The parameter 
estimate for this variable is expected to be negative. Tax revenue may act as a substitute 
for the reserve ratio, in which case    will be negative, or the government may engage 
in optimizing behavior between the tax rate and the reserve ratio in the same way as the 
currency growth rate, in which case the parameter estimate will be positive. 
4 φ
The results of the LSDV estimation including the income tax variables are presented 
in Table 2.
9 The parameter estimates for the deposit/income and tax variables are not 
 
8 Central government revenue is item number 81 in IFS. It includes many types of taxes including income, 
sales, property, and trade taxes, and it does not include seigniorage revenue. 
9 I do not constrain    to be equal to    as implied by the theoretical model.  1 φ 3 φRENÉE D. NIEBERDING    144
significant. All other variables retain their expected signs. The only major changes in the 
other coefficient estimates are that the trend variable is now significant at the one 
percent level and the deposit-currency ratio and openness to trade variables are no longer 
significant.
10 The correlations between the tax variable and the deposit-currency and 
trade variables are 0.28 and 0.38, respectively, while the correlations between the 
deposit-GDP ratio and the deposit-currency and trade variables are 0.57 and 0.10, 
respectively. Thus, the decreased significance of the latter two variables does not appear 
to be caused by multicollinearity. 
 
 
Table 2.    Results of the LSDV Model Including Other Government Revenue 
Independent Variable 
(Natural Logarithm) 
Coefficient Estimate  t statistic
 
Year -0.010  -3.15
** 
Deposit/Currency Ratio  0.137  1.63
 
Currency Growth Rate  0.158 3.64
** 
Democracy 0.110  2.61
** 
Democracy Squared  -0.012  -2.27
* 
(Exports + Imports)/GDP  -0.099  -1.42
 
Deposit/GDP -0.078  -1.00 
Revenue/GDP -0.294  -0.31 
R
2  0.527 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the effective reserve ratio, defined as reserves as a 
proportion of total money demand. One asterisk next to the t statistic indicates the coefficient estimate is 
significant at the 5% level; two indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
The governments in the sample appear to be minimizing the welfare losses 
associated with currency and reserve creation regardless of the level of other revenue. In 
general, government revenue has increased in these countries during the 1967-94 time 
period. However, it may be that moderate increases in other revenue have not been 
enough to impact the strategic use of the reserve ratio to augment seigniorage revenue.   
 
Exogeneity of the Currency Growth Rate and the Deposit-Currency Ratio 
 
The model assumes that the governments simultaneously choose the effective 
 
10 Adding the government revenue variable ad-hoc (omitting the   term) yields similar results. 
The currency growth rate and democracy variables retain their expected signs and are significant while the 
trend variable becomes significant at the one percent level and the deposit-currency ratio and openness to 
trade variables lose significance. 
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reserve ratio and the currency growth rate. Thus, the currency growth rate and the 
deposit-currency ratio may be endogenous. However, a joint test of the hypothesis that 
these variables are exogenous using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test yields a chi-squared 
statistic of 2.68, which has a probability level of 0.26. Thus, the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity cannot be rejected.   
Nevertheless, because the deposit-currency ratio and the currency growth rate are 
theoretically endogenous, the results of the model using the lagged values of these 
variables are presented in Table 3. All variables retain their expected signs. The currency 
growth rate drops in significance (the probability level for the t-statistic of 1.82 is 0.068), 
while the deposit-currency ratio is insignificant. The democracy variables and the trade 
variable are significant at the one and five percent levels, respectively. Thus, the 
principal results of the other estimations are not refuted. 
 
 
Table 3.    Results of the LSDV Model Using One-Period Lags of the Deposit/Currency 
Ratio and the Currency Growth Rate 
Independent Variable 
(Natural Logarithm) 
Coefficient Estimate  t statistic 
Year  -0.002  -0.46 
LagDeposit/Currency Ratio  0.010  0.13 
Lag Currency Growth Rate  0.074  1.82 
Democracy  0.140  3.29
** 
Democracy Squared  -0.017  -3.00
** 
(Exports + Imports)/GDP  -0.126  -1.99
* 
R
2  0.498 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the effective reserve ratio, defined as reserves as a 
proportion of total money demand. One asterisk next to the t statistic indicates the coefficient estimate is 
significant at the 5% level; two indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Regression Results Omitting the Ad-hoc Variables 
 
The democracy variables and the openness to trade measure are not derived from the 
theoretical model. As a check on the robustness of the theoretical model, the regression 
is run without the ad-hoc variables. The results are presented in Table 4. Both the 
deposit-currency ratio and currency growth rate are positive and significant at the one 
percent level of confidence. The R
2 for the regression is 0.440. The results omitting the 
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Table 4.    Results of the LSDV Model Omitting the Ad-hoc Variables 
Independent Variable 
(Natural Logarithm) 
Coefficient Estimate  t statistic 
Year  -0.005  -1.30 
Deposit/Currency Ratio  0.193  2.60
** 
Currency Growth Rate  0.158  4.08
** 
R
2  0.440 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the effective reserve ratio, defined as reserves as a 
proportion of total money demand. One asterisk next to the t statistic indicates the coefficient estimate is 
significant at the 5% level; two indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The evidence supports the optimal government finance theory outlined in Section 3. 
The coefficient estimate for the natural logarithm of the currency growth rate is positive 
and significant at the one percent level. The countries in the sample appear to be 
increasing and decreasing the reserve ratio and the currency growth rate in tandem 
consistent with a welfare minimization objective. This result is robust to the inclusion of 
other government revenue in the estimation. Evidence for the effect of openness to trade 
on the effective reserve ratio is mixed; the coefficient estimate is insignificant if 
government revenue is included in the estimation. 
The level of democracy also appears to play a role in the governments’ use of the 
reserve requirement with those governments in the mid-range of the democracy scale 
having the highest effective reserve ratios. The results are indicative of the difficulties 
inherent in the transition to democracy. As Barro (1997) notes, in one view democracy 
encourages free markets and thereby increases economic growth. However, growth- 
inhibiting aspects of democracy, such as the enhanced role of interest groups in 
redistributing income, also exist. Such demands on the government appear to be the 
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